Civil War Book Review
Summer 2011

Article 24

A Glorious Army: Robert E. Lee's Triumph, 1862-1863
Dennis Showalter

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/cwbr

Recommended Citation
Showalter, Dennis (2011) "A Glorious Army: Robert E. Lee's Triumph, 1862-1863," Civil War Book Review:
Vol. 13 : Iss. 3 .
DOI: 10.31390/cwbr.13.3.08
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/cwbr/vol13/iss3/24

Showalter: A Glorious Army: Robert E. Lee's Triumph, 1862-1863

Review
Showalter, Dennis
Summer 2011

Wert, Jeffrey A Glorious Army: Robert E. Lee’s Triumph, 1862-1863. Simon &
Schuster, $30.00 ISBN 978-1-4165-9334-8
Exploring Lee’s High Tide
Jeffry Wert, a free-lance historian of the Civil War, focuses on the Eastern
Theater of operations. Some of his best work includes biographies of James
Longstreet and Jeb Stuart and a history of the Shenandoah Valley Campaign of
1864. Wert is remarkably successful at avoiding, on one hand, the “gunpowder
and magnolias" romanticism still prevalent in the subject, and on the other,
rejecting the currently fashionable root-and-branch revisionism that presents Lee
and his men as pawns in a war not merely hopeless but bungled.
A Glorious Army shows Wert at his best. He begins before the Army of
Northern Virginia became the force of myth and legend, when it was still little
more than an aggregation of regiments and brigades, learning its collective craft
and commanded by officers still learning theirs. He introduces Lee when he was
not “mares Robert" to his men, but “Granny Lee" and “The King of Spades." The
time was June, 1862; a seemingly overwhelming Union army was at the gates of
Richmond. Lee understood that to lose the Confederate capital was to lose the
war. But battlefield victories by themselves would not achieve Confederate
independence: the ultimate objective must be the North’s will. That will must be
broken; wearing it down would exhaust the South’s lesser resources first. The
best way to secure independence by negotiation was through a series of victories
spectacular enough to demonstrate that restoring the Union by force carried a
price tag too high even for that result.
Wert depicts Lee’s strategic vision as resembling that of a short-money
player in a table-stakes poker game. Audacity, risking and accepting heavy
losses, was both a desperate approach and a rational calculation. The immediate
result was an operational counterattack that, in a week, had driven a discomfited
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Army of the Potomac back to its James River base. Immediately turning north,
The Army of Northern Virginia won what Wert legitimately calls “Lee’s
Masterpiece" at Second Manassas, and then took the war to northern soil.
Sharpsburg, as the Confederates called it, may have been tactically indecisive. It
may have resulted in Lee’s retreating to Virginia, but the battle was also a moral
triumph, confirming the Army of Northern Virginia’s fighting power beyond
dispute.
Three months later, Fredericksburg, “the easiest battle of the war,"
established Lee and his army more firmly as symbols and bearers of Confederate
identity (173). Any lasting doubts were erased in May 1863 at Chancellorsville.
Wert calls it Lee’s finest tactical victory. The army’s collective belief in its
invincibility approached hubris. The annus mirabilis had cost heavy casualties,
especially at the middle-levels of command. But Lee was convinced that the
North’s growing clamor for peace could become decisive with one more victory
on Yankee soil. On June 10 the Army of Northern Virginia began its decisive
march northward—to Gettysburg.
In his initial report of the battle, Lee stated “More may have been required
of [the troops] than they were able to perform." Without editorializing, Wert
agrees. After Gettysburg the war in the East developed into precisely the kind of
attritional struggle Lee knew the South could not win. The twenty-one month
end game only confirmed Lee and his army as “the icons of Confederate
history." Wert makes a convincing case that they followed the best possible route
to a Confederate victory against objectively formidable odds. Lee imprinted the
Army of Northern Virgina; the army forged Lee’s military legacy. In less than a
year, the synergistic relationship forged a combat record unmatched in US
history, and fundamentally altered the Civil War’s direction.
Dennis Showalter is Professor of History at Colorado College and Past
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